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Central Asia presents the European Union with a 
uniquely problematic set of security challenges. 
Enumerated in their most basic form, without reference 
to context, the challenges are formidable enough: the 
threat of violent extremism, a well established conduit 
for smuggling illegal narcotics and potential instability 
rife with the possibility of conflict and humanitarian 
catastrophe. But these challenges are not stand-alone 
issues that can be treated individually; they are 
embedded in a regional context that creates additional 
difficulties for engagement. Namely, while Central 
Asian states may share a common understanding of 
‘security challenges’, that understanding differs 
considerably from accepted definitions within the EU. 
More importantly, the Central Asian states themselves 
have evolved in various directions since gaining 
independence in 1991, and it is by no means clear that a 
‘regional policy’ is the most effective means by which  
to engage them. 
This paper examines security challenges in Central Asia 
in light of the recently adopted EU strategy. It begins 
with an examination of the differing definitions of 
‘security’ and disjunctions within Central Asia before 
moving to a discussion of the linked challenges of 
extremism, drug trafficking and potential instability. 
Recommendations are presented in the conclusions. 
What do we mean by 'security'? 
In established democracies with strong institutions, 
security challenges on the national level are broadly 
understood as serious, wide-ranging threats to the well-
being of the citizenry that are best countered by 
concerted government action. This definition presumes 
the existence of robust, transparent institutions; 
elections in accord with international standards; and an 
elected political leadership that is accountable to voters. 
As a result, it does not envision a contradiction between 
the actions of government and the interests of citizens. 
The assumption rarely holds in Central Asia. None of 
the Central Asian nations is a fully functioning 
democracy in the sense accepted by the EU, as 
indicated by numerous reports prepared by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) on the monitoring of elections in the region. 
Some of the Central Asian nations lack all but the barest 
trappings of democratic governance. All of Central 
Asia's states are, to one degree or another, nations in 
which an elite partly or wholly consumed by the pursuit 
of its own material interests maintains power through 
the exercise of decorative democracy. With elections 
stage-managed and institutions weak, the elite, which 
breaks down into a welter of informal influence groups 
vying for control of material resources, is largely 
unaccountable. 
Throughout the region, national elites have repeatedly 
demonstrated their commitment to a single overriding 
interest – the preservation of power to maintain a 
materially beneficial status quo. This does not preclude 
the existence of other interests, including the common 
good of ordinary citizens, but it by no means presumes 
them. 
Elite commitment to the maintenance of the status quo 
is usually expressed in terms of a need to preserve 
‘stability’, with Western calls for  reform or the 
application of international standards frequently 
interpreted as menacing attempts to ‘destabilise’ the 
country. After Uzbekistan used massive force to quell 
unrest in Andijon in May 2005, for example, a number 
of Western nations issued calls for an independent 
international inquiry. In a typical example of an official 
Uzbek response at the time, the country's embassy in 
Kyrgyzstan issued a statement lambasting “the 
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puppeteers who want to destabilise the Ferghana Valley 
by means of obedient international organisations and 
NGOs continue to exploit the fallout from the failed 
plan to bring off an armed coup in Uzbekistan in order 
to justify their step-by-step imposition of the so-called 
‘project to advance democracy’.”
1 
An article in the government-controlled Uzbek 
newspaper  Pravda vostoka on 24 June 2005, made a 
similar point: "Under the pretext of concern for human 
rights, there are unceasing attempts to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the independent state of Uzbekistan. 
Especially active in this respect is the United States, 
which uses the cover of the United Nations and the 
creation of an international commission to destabilise 
the situation."
2 
In a word, Central Asian elites are strongly inclined to 
define as a ‘security challenge’ anything that they 
perceive as a threat to their power, including calls for 
democratic reform. In extreme cases, this produces a 
near-total disjunction with the EU concept of a security 
challenge. For example, a Central Asian regime may 
perceive political pluralism as a security challenge and 
commit considerable resources to prevent this 
undesirable outcome. In less extreme cases, a Central 
Asian regime may commit scant resources, say, to 
narcotics smuggling both because it does not see the 
problem as a threat to its power and because elements 
of the ruling elite may view the financial rewards they 
reap from involvement in the drug trade as an 
enhancement to their power. 
This disjunction puts the EU in a double bind. First, as 
in the case of political pluralism, a situation may arise 
in which the Central Asian regime views as a security 
challenge something that the EU considers a desired 
outcome. Second, the means the Central Asian regime 
employs to meet its perceived security challenge, which 
include the suppression of dissent in the case of 
political pluralism, may in fact create a situation that the 
EU views as a security challenge in and of itself – 
namely, a suffocating political system that increases the 
chances of instability. 
This paper uses EU definitions of security challenges, 
but it does not presume that the definitions employed 
here match those of Central Asian regimes. The 
disjunction is of minor importance in the overview but 
of considerably greater importance in the 
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Does 'Central Asia' exist? 
Like the nations that make up the EU, Central Asian 
nations share considerable historical, cultural and, at 
times, linguistic similarities against a backdrop of 
significant differences. Unlike the EU, however, Central 
Asia is not home to a regional integrationist project with 
a well developed institutional structure. While Central 
Asian nations belong to a variety of regional 
organisations, there is no regional organisation that 
consists solely of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, nor are any of the 
supranational organisations to which these countries 
belong remotely similar to the EU. 
What's more, the nations of Central Asia have followed 
distinct trajectories of development since gaining their 
independence in 1991. Kazakhstan enjoys increasing oil 
wealth, along with the problems of an extraction-based 
economy, and has embarked on limited democratic 
reforms. Resource-poor Kyrgyzstan has suffered from 
economic malaise and, since 2005, political turmoil, yet 
it has achieved a degree of rough-hewn political 
pluralism that is unique in the region. Tajikistan endured 
a destructive 1992-97 civil war, and has been 
economically battered and politically quiescent ever 
since. Turkmenistan veered into extreme isolationism 
and mounting socio-economic peril under the despotic 
rule of President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov and now 
faces uncertain prospects under the leadership of 
President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. Uzbekistan 
confronts considerable socio-economic problems with 
few venues for dissent and a disturbing history of 
violent incidents. 
This overview perforce treats Central Asia as a region. 
Nevertheless, while grouping security challenges under 
thematic rubrics, it looks also at national specifics 
within each rubric. The recommendations deal in more 
detail with the problem of EU engagement with a 
‘region’ that is really composed of five distinct and 
disparate nations. 
Extremism 
The security challenge most commonly associated with 
Central Asia is religious extremism; more precisely, the 
threat of radical Islam. Despite the attention this issue 
has received, both from Central Asian governments and 
foreign powers, it is by no means clear that it is truly the 
most serious security challenge facing the region. 
Moreover, the efforts undertaken by Central Asian 
governments to stamp out extremism provide a textbook 
example of differing EU and Central Asian definitions 
of ‘security challenges’, posing additional questions 
about the possibility of effective engagement on this 
issue. 
Central Asia is home to at least one internationally 
known terrorist organisation and one widespread 
movement espousing extremist views. The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which grew out of 
radical tendencies in the Uzbek section of the Ferghana Security Challenges in Central Asia| 3 
 
 
Valley in the 1990s, eventually adopted a violent, 
extremist ideology not unlike that of Al-Qaeda, with 
which the IMU established strong organisational ties in 
Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Recognised as a terrorist 
organisation by the US State Department, the IMU 
carried out armed incursions into Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the late 1990s. 
After 9/11, the US-led military operation in 
Afghanistan, where the IMU had come to base itself, 
seriously impacted the organisation's operational 
abilities and drove it to seek refuge in the lawless 
hinterlands of Pakistan. Though occasional reports have 
indicated that the IMU may be regrouping in Pakistan, 
and may be widening its target theatre as the Islamic 
Movement of Turkestan, it is not certain that the 
organisation retains any real capability to carry out 
terrorist operations in Central Asia. Recent fighting in 
Pakistan appeared to degrade the IMU's operational 
capacity even further.
3 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an organisation that emerged in 
the Arab world in the 1950s, seeks to unite all Muslims 
in a restored caliphate ruled by Islamic law. HT 
employs stinging anti-American and anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, and its ultimate goal would seem to imply the 
overthrow of secular regimes throughout the Muslim 
world, including Central Asia, yet the organisation 
claims that it pursues change by non-violent means. In 
Central Asia, HT operates through a clandestine cell 
structure and reportedly has thousands of followers, 
leading some to speculate that HT could potentially 
mount a Bolshevik-style coup attempt should it 
abandon its avowed commitment to non-violent means. 
A number of incidents in Uzbekistan, including a series 
of bombings and shootouts in Tashkent in 2004 and a 
popular uprising in Andijon in 2005, underscored the 
potential for violence in the region, although the extent 
of the role played by extremist ideology and violent 
Islamists in these events is somewhat unclear. There 
were substantial indications that the 2004 violence in 
Tashkent was the work of an extremist group, but the 
absence of a credible investigation has left many 
questions unanswered. 
The unrest in Andijon in May 2005, which Uzbek 
authorities crushed with the use of massive force, neatly 
illustrated the ambiguities surrounding the issue of 
religious extremism in Central Asia. The Uzbek 
authorities asserted that the violence was perpetrated by 
an Islamic extremist group called Akramiya, although 
there were credible indications that the uprising had a 
strong socio-economic component. Moreover, accounts 
by independent witnesses that the Uzbek security 
services massacred demonstrators were never properly 
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investigated, and the trial of individuals involved in the 
violence failed to meet international standards of 
fairness and impartiality. 
Uzbekistan has adopted the harshest policies on 
extremism, with thousands of people believed to be 
imprisoned there on flimsy charges of Islamist activity.
4 
Other Central Asian governments have also employed 
tough tactics to deal with the threat, and credible 
allegations of human rights violations by security 
services in the battle against extremism have emerged in 
virtually every Central Asian country. A considerable 
body of expert opinion argues that the methods adopted 
by Central Asian governments, and particularly the 
Uzbek authorities, are counterproductive, and have in 
fact contributed to the rise of extremism in the region. 
Viewed in the context of extremist movements 
worldwide, Central Asia's threat does not appear to 
warrant the draconian measures often employed by 
regional governments. The number of terrorist attacks in 
Central Asia is relatively low, and the involvement of 
Central Asian extremists in globally active terrorist 
organisations is minimal (with the notable exception of 
the IMU's close ties to Al-Qaeda, although that 
phenomenon appears to be geographically limited to 
parts of Pakistan, and perhaps Afghanistan, at present). 
This does not mean that violent extremism is not a 
threat in Central Asia. The region has numerous features 
that make it a potential breeding ground for terrorists. 
Poverty in and of itself does not foster extremism, but 
the same cannot be said of serious socio-economic 
problems left to fester by unaccountable, undemocratic 
governments that err on the side of brutality in their 
efforts to combat extremism. 
Narcotics 
Central Asia is an important corridor for the smuggling 
of illegal narcotics produced in Afghanistan through 
Russia to European markets. The problem is most acute 
in Tajikistan, which shares a long, porous border with 
Afghanistan, but it is present in all of the other Central 
Asian countries as well. Moreover, the growing 
presence of cheap illegal narcotics, and particularly 
heroin, is fueling drug abuse within Central Asian 
countries. This has resulted in rising rates of HIV/AIDS, 
with the use of contaminated needles the most common 
route of infection. The UN has warned that if the spread 
of HIV/AIDS is not contained, a serious public health 
crisis could emerge in coming years. Finally, the same 
channels used by drug smugglers to move illegal 
narcotics could serve as conduits for extremists to ferry 
weapons and explosives across borders. 
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Instability 
Instability remains a looming threat in Central Asia. As 
2003-05 upheaval in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
demonstrated, post-Soviet regimes – of which the 
Central Asian nations are outstanding examples – 
cannot be assumed to be stable. What's worse, since the 
regime changes in those three countries do not seem to 
have made a fundamental impact on the underlying 
system of flawed governance, there is no guarantee that 
history will not be repeated. If anything, the post-Soviet 
world's clan-ridden, decoratively democratic and often 
kleptocratic regimes appear to become less stable as 
they age, their dysfunctional political systems incapable 
of imparting legitimacy or resolving internal 
contradictions. Bungled elections are only one potential 
flashpoint. In the more authoritarian systems, where the 
greatest power is concentrated in aging presidents and 
repressive mechanisms are most prominently employed 
to maintain order, succession poses grave risks. 
Since the end of the Tajik civil war in 1997, the centre 
has held in Central Asia, despite violent outbursts in 
Uzbekistan and the tumultuous fall of President Askar 
Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Even the sudden death of 
long-ruling Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in 
December 2006, saw Deputy Prime Minister 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov ascend to the 
presidency in what appeared to be a smoothly 
orchestrated succession (although the true extent of the 
new president's power remains somewhat unclear). 
But it would be foolish to assume that the tenuous 
centre will hold indefinitely. Broadly speaking, the 
region's political systems are as opaque as its socio-
economic problems are clear. More specifically, 
instability could result from infighting in 
Turkmenistan's new leadership, from renewed violence 
or a succession struggle in Uzbekistan, or from 
unchecked political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. Even in 
Kazakhstan, which has benefited from windfall oil 
profits, one should remember that it is not poverty that 
spawns conflict, but inequality. 
Instability in any Central Asian country could open a 
Pandora's box of problems with significant spillover 
potential for neighbouring countries. Violent conflict 
along ethnic or regional lines could wreak havoc in a 
number of places, but most devastatingly in the densely 
populated Ferghana Valley. Conflict would cause 
refugee flows for which the regional infrastructure is 
woefully unprepared. And conflict zones are often the 
greatest incubators of extremism. 
Governance 
As the preceding overview suggests, the issue of 
governance is of dual relevance to the EU as it 
implements its strategy for engaging Central Asian 
nations. First, in each of the security challenges 
reviewed here – the threat of extremism, narcotics 
smuggling, and instability – governance is of crucial 
importance. Central Asian governments share a 
penchant for repressive, and possibly counterproductive, 
measures to combat extremism. Law enforcement 
agencies are rife with corruption to an extent that eases 
the flow of narcotics through the region. And the overall 
lack of good governance in Central Asia creates 
preconditions for instability. 
Nevertheless, there is no way to engage Central Asia 
effectively without engaging Central Asian 
governments. While some countries, such as 
Kyrgyzstan, boast relatively numerous and vibrant non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the pervading 
attitude in the region towards NGOs is suspicion, even 
outright hostility. In Turkmenistan, NGOs are for all 
practical purposes non-existent. In Uzbekistan, they 
operate under heavy surveillance and tight constraints. 
Moreover, the crucial role played by national 
governments in efforts to combat extremism, narcotics 
trafficking and instability underscores the need to 
confront the issues of governance that have hamstrung 
the effectives of these efforts in Central Asia. 
In its efforts to engage Central Asian governments, the 
EU should remain aware of the above-noted regional 
tendency to view Western reform initiatives as 
potentially damaging to their hold on power and, thus, 
as security threats. Russia and China reinforce this view, 
with the Russian- and Chinese-dominated Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO: China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) a case 
in point. As this author argued elsewhere: "for SCO 
member states, 'terrorism, separatism, and extremism' 
are viewed not as distinct abstract phenomena with 
global relevance to be dealt with globally, but rather as a 
single phenomenon that is locally defined by the ruling 
elite and left to sovereign states to combat by any means 
they see fit”.
5 To this end, the SCO's charter lists among 
its aims and objectives "joint opposition to terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations," 
but the organisation's first principle is "mutual respect 
for states' sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity and the sanctity of borders, nonaggression, 
noninterference in internal affairs, the non-use of force 
or the threat of force in international relations and 
renunciation of unilateral military superiority in 
contiguous areas". 
Recommendations for EU engagement 
•  The EU should take care to ensure that it sticks to 
its definitions of security challenges and remains 
vigilant to the differing definitions used by Central 
Asian governments. Because the former are 
explicit, while the latter are often implicit, the EU 
must carefully examine the real definitions 
employed on a case-by-case basis and target for 
engagement those areas where it can make progress 
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on security challenges as they are explicitly defined 
within the EU, and not as they are defined 
implicitly by Central Asian governments. The 
strategy states: "To align expectations of Central 
Asian partners with those of the EU will be a 
mutually beneficial and reinforcing process." EU 
representatives should be mindful, however, that 
the alignment of expectations may prove somewhat 
more difficult in practice. 
•  The EU should not make excessive efforts to 
engage Central Asia as a region. Instead, the EU 
should pursue a policy of targeted engagement 
directed at specific issues in specific countries. This 
is particularly important in light of the limited 
availability of resources, since nationally targeted 
engagement can make effective use of resources in 
areas where they can produce results, while a 
region-wide policy will necessarily waste resources 
by spreading them across five countries when they 
are likely to be effective only in some parts of the 
region. The current strategy rightly accords ‘special 
importance’ to bilateral cooperation, but also 
advocates a ‘regional approach’ for a welter of 
issues including organised crime, human, drugs and 
arms trafficking, terrorism and non-proliferation 
issues, inter-cultural dialogue, energy, 
environmental pollution, water management, 
migration as well as border management and 
transport infrastructure. While this is conceptually 
appealing, the less-than-encouraging record of 
regional cooperation in Central Asia suggests that 
the regional approach to these issues should be 
subject to regular review with an eye to alternate 
bilateral approaches. 
•  The EU can and should engage Central Asian 
governments, both because governments are key 
interlocutors in meeting security challenges and 
because the quality of governance is a crucial factor 
in combating extremism, narcotics smuggling, and 
potential instability. 
•  The EU should focus primarily on the quality of 
governance in the fight against extremism and 
narcotics trafficking, and not on efforts to bolster 
existing approaches to these problems. The 
emphasis, in other words, should be on qualitative 
change, not quantitative improvement. 
•  Moving from the regional to the national context, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan present the most 
attractive options for heightened EU engagement. 
Kazakhstan is committed to maintaining solid ties 
with the West through its multi-vector foreign 
policy, and it has invested considerable prestige in 
its bid to chair the OSCE in 2009. This renders it 
amenable to properly formulated and targeted 
reform efforts, and its political system, while far 
from ideal, affords possibilities for positive change. 
Kyrgyzstan, despite its unsettled domestic politics, 
has a thriving civil-society sector, and the country's 
small size makes it a good target for the allocation 
of limited resources. On security issues, neither 
country is as beholden to the rigid security 
conceptions shared by the leaderships of Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. For example, both Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan make fewer efforts to control their 
citizens' movements than Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan and are thus likely to be significantly 
more receptive to cooperation on border issues.  
•  The EU can and should engage Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, but with realistic expectations of what 
can and cannot be achieved. As Turkmenistan 
begins to open up to the outside world in the wake 
of Niyazov's death, opportunities for limited 
engagement will arise, and these should be seized 
upon, particularly in follow-up efforts to ensure the 
implementation of stated reform policies in 
education, health care, and social services. Current 
levels of engagement with Uzbekistan should be 
preserved, with an emphasis on maintaining lines of 
communication with an eye to expanded 
engagement if and when the opportunity presents 
itself. About CEPS
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